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In the context of the current crisis, the fact that EU policies to save the financial integrity of 
the Euro have had deep-reaching consequences in the social fabric and policies of some 
member states towards their populations while not in others has put, as Habermas says, the 
question anew on the agenda of the relationship of democracy and economy in the EU1. 
That the measures had a motivation as reactions on the pressures of the global financial 
markets is as little in doubt as that the speed and energy with which the effects of the 
financial crisis could transform a debt crisis into a sovereign debt crisis has everything to do 
with the efficient neoliberal streamlining of Europe into a single market that is free from 
political interference into or against the socially insensitive demands of global capital. There 
is little doubt among social scientists that the process of EU-integration over the past 30 or 
so years was significantly framed by the globalized attempt –or “frivolous experiment”2-- of 
transforming the former state embedded market economies into market-embedded states3. 
The prime example for this is the introduction of the market-accelerating common currency 
EURO without simultaneously embedding it in a EUROzone-wide network of coordinated 
EUROzone-wide social, fiscal and economic policies with guarantees of sharing, or at least 
controlling the social risks of this homogenization of the market justly among equal member 
states and among all EU-citizens4. If creating a single free market and dismantling the 
political constraints with which players in the economic arena had to calculate earlier5 was 
the purpose of the elaboration of the EU by the member countries, they have done good 
work. But they uncoupled market-integration from political integration in the relevant areas 
                                                          
1 Verfassung Europas 
2 Polyani (1977/1944), Streeck (2011) 
3 Streeck, Brunkhorst, Offe 
4 An excellent analysis of the details of the consequences of this uncoupling of currency and social and fiscal 
policy is offered in Offe (2003) before constitution- and credit-crisis, and still more poignantly with the facts in 
by Streeck 2013. 
5 Dismantling of European social model: Offe (2003) 
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and thus fostered the political divisions within the Eurozone and between the Eurozone and 
the remaining EU-member states to a degree that threatens to jettison the previous 
advances in the political integration of the EU as a supranational organization. One reason 
for this was, for sure, that the unwillingness to develop a proposal for a EU-wide social, 
fiscal and economic policy that would be handled by the EU and intervene in the national 
parliamentary competences would have required (and still does) presenting the proposal to 
the entirety of the national citizenries with the purpose of adapting their corresponding 
constitutions accordingly. Premising the success of economic unification on the uncertain 
outcomes of protracted discussions of principles among the extremely complex variety of 
stakeholders with often dilemmatic directions of pull in their interests in an extremely 
heterogeneous collection of national economies and social systems arguably would have 
doomed the very idea to failure. That the very idea was good was beyond doubt as long as it 
didn’t show its costs. Now it does, and the extreme strain of the social systems in the loser 
countries brought home the heterogeneity of economic capacity and interests among those 
forcibly treated homogeneously by the guardians of the global currency- credit- and 
exchange markets and the guardians of Euro-stability. Once again, now under the pressure 
of social movements responding to the unjust distribution of risks between social groups 
and groups of nations, the wisdom and legitimacy of imposing constraints stemming from a 
decision made at the supranational level on national governments who normatively are in 
charge of protecting their populations from degradation and undue inequality of 
opportunities with other member-states returned to the agenda with a vengeance. 
In the relevant field, social scientists and economists had long been averting to the facts of 
heterogeneity and complexity in the ways in which social, fiscal and economic systems were 
linked in the various member states to ensure a functioning distribution of wealth and 
welfare among the citizenry. Not putting the requisite political part of the Eurofication on 
the agenda on the part of the EU-decision makers was in this sense an adequate expression 
of a consciousness of the non-existence of a single European social space. However, what is 
not put up for public debate in the first place and yet decided6 clearly has dubitable 
                                                          
6 (because aggregatively speaking, there is of course a EU-wide social space, but not a coordinated one, hence 
none that would allow concerted political action –and in this sense, the mothers and fathers of the Euro did 
decide to exclude coordinate influence of politics on the market-imperatives governing the Euro in the global 
financial markets) 
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standing as to whether it meets the standards of democratic decision-making and thus, 
whether it can count as legitimate according to the standards expected from each of the 
member states by EU-law itself.7  
But, as I said, the extent of the current crisis has forced to the fore even more profound 
questions, since intelligent inquiry into the structures responsible for the rampaging loss of 
social safety cannot exclude at the outset that the causes lie deeper. Are there any general 
lessons from the particular current crisis to be learnt about the relationship of democratic 
legitimacy and supranational institutions? The complaint seems to be that the introduction 
of the Euro and the imposition of political constraints on national parliaments by the EU-
institutions in charge of steering the Euro should have been given a chance for the 
democratic review that the objective matters at hand –viz., that the introduction of a 
currency inevitably affects social, economic and fiscal aspects of sovereign government 
activity-- would have required. But doesn’t that complaint respond to circumstances that 
are merely a symptom for a more principled unresolved issue? After all, the complaint 
presupposes that it could have been democratically justified to decide an arrangement of 
supranational institutions and regulations that bind the democratically justified national 
governments and parliaments. But the real problem is perhaps that there are reasons why 
supranational organizations in general must not legitimately interfere with democratically 
legitimized national governments and legal orders, or at least reasons when such 
interference isn’t legitimate, such that evaluated in light of these reasons, the EU meets one 
of such legitimacy-disabling conditions. This type of question will be the topic of my 
discussion. 
I will present three versions –Grimm, Offe and Streeck—of a general argument that is often 
used to establish that the EU-institutions meets such a legitimacy-disabling condition, the so 
called “no demos” argument (II). Before doing this, it will be necessary for an adequate 
appreciation of its pull to mention some of its reasonable motivations by embedding it in 
the context of the notorious “democratic deficit” suspicions against the legal system and 
practice of the EU (I). After quickly examining the logical structure behind the no-demos 
intuition considered as an argument (III), I will then present principled reasons by Möllers 
and Habermas that show why the “no demos” argument fails to have bite in discussions of 
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the legitimacy and status of the supranational level in the multi-level EU-architecture, 
complemented by another principled reasons arising from John Dewey’s conception of the 
“public” as a clearer alternative for the “popular” requirement of democratic legitimation 
(IV). I will conclude that all three conceptions together suggest that the hunt after pre-
politically existing peoples as foundations of democratic legitimacy expresses, in spite of the 
theoretically elaborate apparatuses utilized to pump the no-demos intuition, no more than 
methodological nationalism without any footing in the material requirements of democratic 
legitimation. Given the absence of a principled problem with the legitimacy of the priority 
and interference of supranational EU-law in the national legal and political orders, there are 
also no principled reasons to abandon or discredit the European project in the absence of a 
European nation or society. 
 
I. “Democratic deficit” in the legal system and practice of the EU 
To begin with, the agreements and treaties forming the EU in the process of European 
integration over the past 60 years have been decided by democratically elected officials of 
the member states in unanimous concert authorized to take such decisions. After the 
landmark decisions of the Court of the European Union in the early 1960s VanGeld and 
Costa, it is established legal opinion that the treaties expressed the will of the associated 
states to treat all of their subjects uniformly, and in this sense, to acknowledge EU 
regulations as a voluntarily accepted constraint on national jurisdiction and legislation, and 
since the fusion of TEU, TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU into the 
Lisbon Treaty, the legal form of the EU can arguably be considered to be that of a de facto 
constitutionalized supranational institution. Given that the Lisbon Treaty contains the 
requirement that the EU accede as a subject to international law to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, guarantees all the liberal-democratic subjective and civil 
rights to all EU-citizens and prescribes liberal democracy under the rule of law as the only 
legitimate form of government, the process of constitutionalization of the EU can be seen as 
largely accomplished, and as having created a regional regime of democratic guarantees in 
the territory comprised by the territories of its member states. As with growing integration, 
more and more functions and policies of the democratically legitimized legal orders of the 
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national states that EU-citizens belong to come under the influence of decisions made at the 
level of the EU-institutions, suspicions of “democratic deficits” of the EU have not become 
less but rather more pronounced downstream. Talk of “Eurocrats”, “Monster Brussels”8 and 
no-comment quotations of the applicability of the regulations regarding teleferics to 
Holland9 are expressive of these reluctancies. 
Although there are manifold reasons for this diagnostic, the fact that the EU forms a multi-
level system of governance with very complicated and partly flawed flows of accountability 
between its outputs and civic input seems to play a large role in most of them. No less 
complicated and often diffuse are the flows of civic participation in decision making 
processes. Weightier than concerns about complexity and the corresponding decrease in 
transparency vis-à-vis the citizen are concerns about certain routine ways of decision 
making at the EU-level in which access of civic control to the process seems to be positively 
blocked out. The main focus of attention in this regard is on the prevalence of 
intergovernmental decision-making by way of closed-door negotiations by the Council of 
Europe, i.e. the periodic summits of the leaders of the executives of the member states, in 
many fields of policy making that affect large parts of the population which, unsurprisingly, 
demand more influence either directly or indirectly via the national parliaments on the 
outcomes of these negotiations. The decisions made at the summits in intergovernmental 
agreements between national executives become, at the level of the EU, directives to be 
implemented by the respective national legal systems. Given the pressures connected with 
non-compliance with EU-directives that are exercised on the national legislatives, the latter 
in most cases deliberate with a foregone conclusion, and not open-endedly. The best term 
for this intergovernmental form of governance would be federal executivism, since it 
virtually marginalizes parliamentary control and thus, mediately, control by the 
representatives of the people. That this intergovernmental mode of decision-making causes 
legitimacy deficits becomes clear in those fields where the Lisbon treaty does not require a 
further check on the decisions made in the Council of Europe by the European parliament, 
for example fiscal, social and economic policy. In these fields, a national executive who feels 
that the national legislative would not accept a legislative initiative and then gets the 
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universal approval by her colleagues in the Council of Europe, thereby acquires a binding 
EU-regulation that the national parliament has to adopt on pain of EU-sanctions. If we 
distinguish between representative, accountability and participatory demands on 
democratic legitimacy, the only demand met by those decisions is that an elected official 
representing her national population was involved in making the decision, but –given that 
the risky proposal was not discussed in the national parliament—neither participatory 
deliberative nor –given that the directive from Brussels has to be implemented on pain of 
sanctions by the EU against the dissenting nation—accountability for the acceptance of the 
decision by the national executive is safeguarded. For all intents and purposes, the control 
of executive activity by the people or their representatives is reduced to an unnoticeable 
minimum. To make matters worse, in those fields where each member of the elected 
national governments used to have a functional veto power in the European council (of 
ministers), now majority decisions have an extended use, so that it becomes possible to 
bind even dissenting nations to the decisions that pass both legislative branches, and via the 
so-called “Passarelle” mechanism, the council can itself decide to declare a subject that was 
deemed to require unanimous decisions subject to majority-decision, thereby obviating the 
resistance of national parliaments that wouldn’t allow their governments to go along. This 
entails the danger of a cold transfer of competences of control from national parliaments to 
the intergovernmental decision-making at the EU-level in the council of ministers, i.e. 
members of the national executives that eliminate parliamentary control. At the conclusion 
of both processes, the EU-rule is to be implemented at all national levels irrespective of 
further deliberations in their parliaments. Consequently, many warnings emerged in the 
discussions about the Lisbon treaty that Brussels was “seizing powers from us”,10 and that 
the rationale of intergovernmental decision making clearly is not legitimacy but expediency. 
This diagnostic of an institutionally unresolved democratic deficit is correct, and it is also 
true that the thus intergovernmentally acquired decisions suffer from a legitimation-deficit 
because the chain of legitimation from the people through their representatives to the 
decision as much as any public discussion and deliberative elements in the procedure have 
been sacrificed in favor of intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, it is also true that the 
field still placed by the Lisbon treaty under this type of governance at the EU-level are 
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crucial for the political, social and economic well-being of the populations. But one also has 
to underscore that in a growing number of fields, the Lisbon treaty requires what is known 
as the “ordinary legislative procedure” in which proposals by the Commission, i.e. the EU-
executive authorized by the EU parliament, or by the Council of Europe through the 
European council have to pass parliamentary review and approval by the European Council 
(i.e. the part of the legislative representing the national interests through the competent 
ministers). That is, although there are serious institutional democratic deficits to be 
removed, the development of political integration of the EU appears to point in many fields 
towards an increasing democratization of governance also at the level of EU decision making 
itself. In those fields where this is the case it would also appear that EU-regulations disclose 
to themselves their own source of democratic legitimation flowing from the totality of EU 
citizens represented as members of the totality of all national member states represented in 
the EU-parliament, and represented as members of their respective nations by the 
democratically authorized members of the executives EU-nations in the European Council.11 
Given that the treaties’ allocation of competences assigns most fields except for the decisive 
ones of social, economic and fiscal as well as exterior policy already now to the possible 
purview of ordinary legislative procedure, a densification of democratization seems to be a 
concern for the EU on its own. On the other hand, if, as the case may be, there are 
principled problems with purely intergovernmental decision-making at the supranational 
level, then the presence of pockets of purely intergovernmental and intransparent decision-
making might even serve as a good indicator of places where “democratization”-efforts 
ought to put their priority in future renegotiations of the Lisbon treaty. 
II. Three versions of the no-demos argument 
This diagnostic of institutional democratic deficits and the corresponding demands for 
institutional innovation –even if it were to require a change in the treaties and 
correspondingly a EU-wide constitutional discussion about principles and the allocation 
competences— can only convince those who believe that the two-layer legislative structure 
                                                          
11 Unsurprisingly, the EU-parliament itself denies the existence of democracy deficits in a publication on itself 
and points to the unwillingness of the national executives to use the ordinary legislative process open to them 
in most questions by tartly remarking that this behavioral pattern of national leaders who profess their 
engagement in reducing supposed “democracy deficits” much rather looks like an “honesty deficit”. 
(Demokratiedefizit) 
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of the EU-administration can be understood as undergirded by a two-layer structure of 
appropriately legitimizing constituencies. For, the decisions at the EU-level authorized by 
the EU-parliament can only thereby also count as democratically legitimized, i.e. as having 
been approved by a body of representatives whose decisions can be understood as 
expressing what the deliberatively performed decision-making process among the people 
whom they represent would have wanted. Given that EU-parliamentarians are elected in 
EU-wide elections, the relevant deliberating public represented by them would have to be 
the totality of EU citizens considered irrespective of their nationalities. Thus, to be short, the 
legitimacy of EU-regulations seems to depend on the assumption that the totality of EU-
citizens forms an articulate people capable of deliberating and of reflectively forming its 
own will as a result of discussions among free and equal citizens, as well as of wanting the 
results of such will-formation be implemented EU-wide as efficient law that applies with 
coercive backup equally to everyone everywhere through national governments that retain 
the coercive powers. The assumption that there is such a European people has been 
contested not only by nationalistic populists12 (for whom the assumption is a definitional 
falsehood), but also by social scientists and legal scholars such as Claus Offe and Dieter 
Grimm and others. 
At its clearest, Dieter Grimm states the argument as follows: 
“Ein europäisches Staatsvolk, dem die Hoheitsgewalt zugerechnet werden könnte, ist 
gar nicht in Sicht. (...) Der Maastrichter Vertrag stellt die Weichen auf einen 
europäischen Bundesstaat, ohne dass diesem ein europäisches Staatsvolk (...) 
entsprechen könnte. (...) [Da] es für Meinungsbildung und Interessenartikulation [in 
Abwesenheit europäischer Parteien, Medien, einer gemeinsamen Sprache, Erziehung 
und Kultur] wieder in nationale Partikel zerf[ällt], [ist das] europäische 
Demokratiedefizit strukturell bedingt und kann nicht durch institutionelle Reformen 
behoben werden.“13 
The challenge posed by this kind of objection to recognizing a binding priority for EU-
regulations is far more fundamental because if it were true the very idea of allowing EU-
regulations to constrain the sovereign national legislator would be entirely misguided 
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9 
 
because they could not possibly have the same degree of legitimacy as the national 
legislator’s decisions14. Therefore, the acceptance of EU-regulations as part of the legal 
order of the national member-states --in particular as binding the decisions of the National 
Supreme Courts as guardians of the national democratic constitutions in which these 
regulations do not appear-- is tantamount to accepting heteronomous imperatives 
(“Fremdbestimmung”). Conversely, strengthening the EU-parliaments’ role in the EU-level 
legislative processes would not lead, in spite of the member of parliaments’ unimpeachable 
credentials as directly democratically elected representatives, to a decrease of democratic 
deficits but on the contrary exacerbate them. After all, members of parliament who cannot 
represent anyone in particular for lack of either a people or a functioning EU-wide public 
discussion and deliberative process of will formation preceding the elections or both are 
essentially free-floating agents with powers to decide matters that bind all national 
parliaments with sufficiently entrenched democratic credentials.15 It is in the context of 
these competitive considerations of whose decision-making power is greater than it should 
be that the relatively simple no-demos pattern actually becomes highly relevant and a 
worthwhile subject of reflection. 
Claus Offe (until his recent unequiviocal pro-European turn16) directs our attention to 
cultural, linguistic, social forms of socialization of enormous heterogeneity, but most 
importantly to the diversity and paradoxes of intra-European interest formation in the 
economic realm, together with the profound differences in the traditionally grown 
structures of their respective welfare, social and labor regimes. From there, he convincingly 
derives  the expectation that there are inevitably irresolvable inequalities among the risks 
that societies in the weaker economies of the EU would have to shoulder common 
supranational social, economic and fiscal laws and concludes that there is no reasonable 
expectation anytime soon that there could be a rationally equally distributed interest 
among the citizens of the member states in EU-regulation and –integration. Since there 
                                                          
14The default priority would always lie with the national parliament’s decisions as long as, to be sure, the EU 
would not re-constitute itself as a sovereign state on its own (this is why Dieter Grimm could easily switch from 
asserting on the basis of one and the same reasoning (!) that the EU was inconstitutionalizable, given the 
absence of a people, to demanding that the EU needs a constitution, as such a constituting act, and only such 
an act, would create, by the very fact, the requisite people). As a matter of fact, both are sides of the same, 
nationalistic coin. 
15 Strohmmeier und Konsorten, Herzog, Scholz 
16 Europa in der Falle 
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would be winners and losers, the fabric of civic solidarity needed for compromise and the 
acceptance of majority decisions would not possibly emerge as a priority over the defense 
of nationally anchored interests in defending the achievements and entitlements of one’s 
own national welfare system. Given that there is no replacement at the EU-level that would 
be equally or more desirable, accepting EU-regulations over national ones would be counter 
to one’s best considered judgment and therefore less the product of a free reflective will 
formation process than of caving in under the pressures of globalization. Thus, the 
legitimacy of EU-level regulations speeding the process up tends to enjoy less deliberatively 
motivated rational backup across the stakeholders in all associated nations than the 
national ones. Therefore, the formation of a European public with rational common and 
therefore universalizable interests that could legitimize EU-level decisions would appear as a 
ideologically not innocent dream without political basis. 
To be fair, Offe’s version of the “no demos” argument tends to appear in the context of 
cautionary tales designed to remind fans of speed in EU-integration of the interest-groups 
behind such pressures to accelerate, and to issue warnings about the nationally unevenly 
distributed risk patterns connected with simply going along without interventions from 
one’s own best, i.e. anti-power-elite constituted interests that are often intertwined with 
the continuity-assumptions built into the social services structures gained in the conflicts 
over the welfare state. All the while, Offe does not exclude that there could be a situation in 
which the best considered interest in the continuity of welfare and redistribution policies 
might be better served when it becomes equipped with adequately democratized European 
structures that are designed to coordinate and consolidate the multifarious stakeholder 
interests at a larger scale that is capable of efficiently facing the conflict with globalized 
economic players.17 He just used to think such a situation was far out of sight. Wolfgang 
Streeck, in his most recent book, radicalizes the argument by portraying the EU as a 
sophisticated, through and through “postdemocratic” “Liberalisation machine” that was 
always and still is exclusively aimed at and supported by the long-term intent to rid the 
world of the contingencies of normative civic contestation and interest articulation for the 
benefit of a neoliberal “Depolitization of the economy as a whole”18. Given this anti-political 
                                                          
17 Recently, he has reversed his conclusions from the analysis of the place of European stakes in the context of 
globalizing neoliberal crisis-responses in “Europa in der Falle”. 
18 Gekaufte Zeit. Vgl. auch Crouch The Strange Non-Death, Crouch Post-democracy 
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nature of the EU-project, the regulations at the EU level are to be seen as responses to a 
different logic than the legal orders at the national level that at least pretend, and are 
bound by the constitutional order to be democratically justified norms. The national political 
and legal orders represent, in this sense, the interests common to the people submitting to 
their laws, to whom they are accountable, and upon whose deliberating interventions and 
participation their content relies. In contrast, the regulations at the EU-level respond to 
what Streeck polemically calls the “Market-constituencies”, i.e. the shareholders and their 
profit-orientation. If this is so, then EU-regulations neither represent, nor reflect the 
participation of stakeholders like you and me, and therefore no interests of the people at 
all. They are non-political in nature, and lack any democratic motivation, left alone 
legitimacy. In unmasking the EU-regulations as in this way democratically vacuous, Streeck 
wishes to deflate the perceived dangers stemming from dismantling the EU-institutions that 
allow market operations to have such drastic effects on member-states, and in this sense, to 
kiss the project of a deepening political union good-bye once and for all. For Streeck, we 
have to realize that it is a fundamentally naïve mistake to see EU as part of a possible 
solution to the problems caused by the crisis instead of as part of the problem. As there are 
and can be no costs to any of us in point of democratic legitimacy because the EU-
institutions were not designed to represent any of us anyway, good riddance. 
 
III. The structure of tacit assumptions behind the “no demos” argument 
To investigate the merits of the “no demos” pattern underlying all three of these otherwise 
very different rejections of the democratic legitimacy of the priority of EU-level regulations 
vis-à-vis the national level, I would first like to switch gears and see in a more formal way 
where in a legitimation-structure the “no demos – no democracy” inference has its justified 
place. According to the requirements on the political realization of communicative 
justification for collectively binding action norms, it is indeed necessary for any community 
with democratic and deliberative majority decision procedures to bind the losers in such 
legitimating discourses reasonably to the rules they actually reasonably reject. More 
generally, if social integration under conditions of free and equal contributors to 
justificational discourses should not be jettisoned by disagreements, one needs some 
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background solidarity or concern for the integrity and permanence of the group that is 
engaged in regulating itself in these reflective discourses. Thus, the no demos argument is 
motivated only insofar as it reminds us of an empirical presupposition of the self-regulation 
through discourses allowing disagreement, viz. the existence of a community that is 
socialized robustly enough to prioritize the fact of being the self-regulating community one 
is over the possibly adverse outcomes of discursive collective will-formation.19 
The question is whether this is substantive enough to decide over the right and legitimacy of 
EU law vis-à-vis national decision-making. After all, this empirical presupposition as such 
does not speak of national (as opposed to, e.g. regional or municipal, or even global) 
communities, only of communities; likewise, it recruits solidarities and social cohesions of a 
more robust sort than those founded merely on agreement in one’s normative opinions, but 
not necessarily such that are determinable by pertinence to the legal, cultural and economic 
community of a nation-state. 
I would also like to distinguish sharply between democratic deficits and legitimacy deficits. 
The former affect the organization of decision procedures with a view to the possibility of 
citizens to count as participants in the decision-making processes as constituted in the 
treaties, whereas the latter concern the normative question whether the type of decisions 
taken at the supranational level in an institutional design such as the EU can be taken as 
sufficiently and independently justified enough according to some democracy principle to 
enjoy the priority over or at least equality to national legislation that the treaties and 
standard EU legal positions attribute to them. If we draw this distinction, it becomes clear 
that the continuously reiterated facts about diversity and heterogeneity across the EU in 
cultural, linguistic, historical, economic, welfare systematic, banking traditions, what have 
you respects all pertain only to the empirical conditions of democratic politics, like the 
assumption that people who deliberate have to understand one another, or that welfare 
systems to be combined into European welfare regimes with a view to social justice and 
thereby universal acceptability have to avoid duplicating bureaucracies and thus eating up 
all the money supposed to go to the stakeholders etc. The mere fact that the public 
organized by the laws it is supposed to be the author of is multilingual and complicated in its 
family histories and weird customs does not as such disable it to be one that can organize 
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itself as author of its own laws.20 With regard to the annoying and inflated reference to 
linguistic diversity as an obstacle to forming a people in the sense of democratic theory, I 
recommend augmenting the budget for recruiting translators and looking to India and the 
US for methods to safeguard same inclusion to people with different languages and limited 
literacy. The same applies to the other issues I mentioned; they present difficulties, 
sometimes conundrums and apparent lose-lose scenarios21, but no principled normative 
problem about legitimizability. 
Of course, both questions are also intimately connected, but nonetheless distinct. 
Democracy deficit talk in the context of the relationship between the legal and political 
orders of the EU-level and the national level concerns rather traditional questions of the 
participatory involvement of citizen in decision making processes and the accountability of 
their officers to them for purposes of the exercise of public autonomy in the form of 
controlling the governing activities of publicly elected officials. In contrast, the question of a 
legitimacy deficit of EU-rules relative to the fixed legitimacy of national legal systems 
concerns the non-traditional question of how priority and legislative competence can be 
construed as democratically justified in a multilevel system of governance such as the EU 
that explicitly rules out in its statutes that it is a hierarchically organized federal system. It is 
with regard to this type of question that I want to evaluate the merits of the no demos 
argument. 
 
To further gauge the preconditions under which the no-demos argument can unfold its 
pull,it is instructive to realize that the no demos ploy represents a truncated inferential 
pattern. The inferential rule is: no demos, therefore no democracy, therefore (in case of 
institutions associating actors at a no-demos level that issues in decisions that pretend to 
bind the democratically constitutes associates even in case of conflict with their established 
legal orders) no legitimacy of the decisions made at the no-demos level. What is contrasted 
here with respect to legitimacy is the unquestioned legitimacy of democratic nation states 
                                                          
20 If this were enough, India and Switzerland could not count as democracies. Some would add Spain. 
21 For an insight into the difficulties of rationally aligning the various reasonable motivations of the European 
stakeholders in light of the purpose of establishing European structures, cf. Offe (2000), and for the still more 
tangible and consequential complexities involved in “harmonizing the EU economic, financial and fiscal 
systems”, cf. Offe 2003. 
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integrated by established legal, social, historical and cultural identity, with the legitimacy 
claim of supranational organizations. 
To gauge the force of the no-demos argument, it is further necessary to quickly recall the 
basics of supranational organizations. They are organizations to the outcomes of whose 
multi-nation-dependent decisions in certain matters of common concern the individual 
member states oblige themselves to bind their own decision making and judicial activities, 
but without thereby giving up their own national sovereignty. Supranational rules enjoy in 
consequence a priority that accrues to them through a practice of application22 in which 
their uniform realization across all member states and towards each individual citizen is 
ensured by virtue of the full sovereign powers of each member state even in cases where 
the result of applying the supranational rule conflicts with national regulations. In these 
cases, by default23 the national rule impeding the uniform realization of the supranational 
rule has to be changed.  
The no-demos argument pattern therefore has to make reference to pre-existing, underlying 
or otherwise given social identities and integrations with permanence-conditions 
independent of the social integration taking place in the pragmatic processes involved in 
discursive legitimation if it is to be able to undermine the presupposed legitimacy claims of 
supranational decisions. Only then can they find that, for the case of the supranational 
regulatory activity, such identities are nowhere to be found, and conclude that therefore, no 
democratically generated legitimation can take place. The no demos ploy now becomes 
visible as an utter triviality in the EU-context. To be proved is that the EU-level regulations 
have less legitimacy than the national ones. The relevant pre-existing identities are, 
unsurprisingly and correctly, the sovereign nation states under international law that existed 
in Europe before the EU. Among these, the EU was absent. As being a nation state before 
the creation of the EU is necessary for legitimation, the nation states organized in the EU are 
the only source of legitimation. We might as well say that the old European nation-states 
are natural and the EU is artificial. This feels like plain bias, not like a substantive theory of 
the conditions presupposed in functioning legitimation processes.  
                                                          
22 Curtzenius 
23 (i.e. unless the existence of the national rule –e.g. a social protection of citizens-- indicates an infraction of 
some supranational-level principle by the rule) 
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IV. Three interlocking defeaters of the no-demos ploy 
I will now try to contrast the traditional metaphysical view behind the no demos ploy with 
more pragmatic and dynamic conceptions of the audience of legitimation to re-evaluate the 
non-traditional genuinely open question of whether there are sufficient social resources for 
EU-level regulations to attain the legitimacy necessary for accepting their superiority of 
application vis-à-vis national rules.24 I want to focus on three ways of defusing the 
compellingness of no-demos type arguments proposed by Möllers, Habermas and Dewey. 
The gist of the following analyses of necessary conditions for legitimacy for supranational 
regulations within the framework established in the EU is this: Suppose the demos were 
either co-constituted or even only anticipated by or as a function of the legitimation 
processes themselves at which end a regulation stands that forms a binding rule for the 
demos. Then there would be, for every rationally and reflectively self-regulating process of 
cooperative decision-making, some demos. Sure, the problem of social stability under 
serious disagreement remains. It might just be a matter of the individual members of that 
demos to look for motivational resources among their social, affective and other relations to 
all the other members of the demos, to look for creative affiliations and emotional 
concerns, or even for good old general values each finds themselves equipped with or 
transnationally occurrent class interests that allow them to discover, in the face of an 
unwelcome decision, whether the value of continuing the whole project is smaller or not 
than getting one’s way in this case. 
Möllers 
This is the basic thrust of Christoph Möllers’ indeterminist conception of the identity of the 
subject of political formation. Against the traditional conception of acts of democratic 
sovereignty as representing an antecedently determinate autonomous will of a well-defined 
population much like the action of an individual may be said to represent her intentions, 
Möllers answers the question for the “subject of public autonomy” or self-rule 
deflationistically with reference to the equal legal status of all actual agents of the will 
                                                          
24 But before a quick cautionary remark: “legitimacy necessary for a certain function of priority” does not 
necessarily entail “more” legitimacy. It just requires the right kind. 
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formation of any public, viz. the individual persons associated by the discursive practices 
with the possible outcome of finding that a proposed norm is equally well acceptable to all 
those affected. These individuals and their perspective on the matter at hand constitute the 
audience and the deliberatively reflective decision-making agency responsible for the 
normative acceptance of a proposed coercive norm, and therefore the proper source of 
democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of individual participants who are socialized or 
at least embedded in complex multicultural and pluralistic societies with multiple 
allegiances, sympathies, interests and evaluative attitudes to be navigated as resources in 
reflective judgments regarding the correctness and acceptability of norms as coercive rules 
on everyone else’s behavior, identifying the adequate perspective from where to take one’s 
evaluative stand is a complex task with many indeterminacies and trade-offs that make a 
result a priori indeterminate. As Möllers states, “From the perspective of a citizen, it is 
impossible to prescribe which membership, which political identity is of most significance to 
him or her (…) It may (..) be the case that a citizen wishes one particular level to play a 
dominant institutional role.”25 The latter is significant, since in a procedural setting with 
majority principle, a citizen may find herself systematically outvoted at one level of 
association, but not at another and demand sub-national autonomous institutions the 
assembly of which is required to follow more stringent methods of decision making (up to 
unanimity) and interacts with the assembly of the whole to fine-tune the democratic will 
formation to adequately reflect preferences of sub-national identities. Such a citizen would 
have good reason (and a good idea of implementation) not to find any act of the whole 
legitimate before having had a say in this way. By parallel reasoning, it follows that “there is 
no imperative priority for the preference not to be outvoted by other Europeans over the 
preference to be represented as a Scot or Catalonian above the level of the state”.26 By still 
more parallel reasoning, there is also no imperative priority to declare as second rate 
procedures in which one participates represented as a EU-citizen over those in which one is 
represented as a national citizen. Similar to Sunstein,27 Möllers reminds us that the 
legitimatorily relevant political identity one has a reasonable claim to be represented in as 
individual citizen is as much a matter of concern and the need of perspective taking in the 
                                                          
25 Multi-Level Democracy, 250 
26 Ibid., 253 
27 Free Markets and Social Justice 
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process of deliberation over the justice of a norm to be applied to a certain audience as it is 
a matter of available levels of representation and decision making and their relationships. In 
this interactive co-constructive process, “procedures define subjects of legitimacy that 
adopt and modify these procedures –or not.”28 This conception shows that the delimitation 
of an adequate audience of legitimation very much varies with the topic, context and the 
regulatory capacities that individuals in political processes are offered. In a multilevel 
system, there is therefore no way to exclude that citizens affected by certain questions 
claim with good reasons to have a say in the decision-making processes at the supranational 
level.29 If so, then the shape and limits of the demos among those associated by the 
applicability of the law to them –whether directly or through nation states is immaterial—is 
variable, not a priori bound to any level in particular in the context of multi-level systems of 
decision making, and subject to reasonable assessment in light of concerns, and therefore a 
priori indeterminate. In sum, a EU-people in the sense relevant to legitimation of EU-wide 
norms, such as it is assumed and acknowledged in the institution of a EU-parliament as a 
“forum of European political contest”30 and other EU-level institutions, as well as by the fact 
that the treaties address their claim to the “citizens and peoples” of the EU is already in 
place wherever EU-citizens deliberate and decide, as well as demand accountability from 
their officials from the perspective of the interests common to EU-inhabitants at large in an 
institutional environment that allows to give such deliberations adequate expression by 
representation at the EU-level. 
 
Habermas 
Habermas’ sophisticated conception of multi-level citizenship and legality as he articulates it 
in his recent writings on the developments and needs of European democratic government 
takes a constructivist stance like Möllers’ for the investigation of the normative status of 
decisions at the national and EU-levels, and in this sense also utilizes the perspective of the 
democratic sovereign in the legal sense, but completes the survey of relevant perspectives 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 260 
29 Cf. Christiano, but with the opposite tendency in his conclusions 
30 Ibid. 262; cf. also, with regard to the need for the formation of an intraparliamentary, intra-institutional, 
non-anti-European opposition to normalize the EU-level decision making procedures: Nassehi, Armin, „Europa 
braucht eine echte Opposition“, ZEIT 15.05.2013. 
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involved in the decision-making processes behind the coercive rules applying to all EU 
citizens. Like Möllers and unlike the no-demos proponents, Habermas identifies in the 
intricate system of accountabilities and traces of civic participation opened in the European 
institutions –with the egregious exception of intergovernmental decision-procedures 
through the Council of Europe that has the potential to threaten the legitimacy potentials 
accomplished by the remaining institutional arrangements if routinely employed for more 
efficient policy making-- a highly innovative notion of possibilities of organizing genuinely 
supranational legitimation practices democratically beyond the familiar structures of federal 
states or international organizations among sovereign nation states. I will have to restrict 
my attention here to a very small part of Habermas’ extremely fascinating reflections that is 
relevant in the current discussion. 
Habermas construes the relationship between member-states and the totality of EU-citizens 
as that of two participants in a legitimating discourse with symmetrical entitlements and a 
common commitment to ensuring the legitimacy of all regulations affecting each of them. 
The supranational level organizes the compound interests, concerns and will of the totality 
of all EU-citizens and in this sense forms a democratic sovereign on its own which is, 
however, not superordinate to the nation-states but merely coordinate with them. At the 
national level viewed aggregately, the same set of persons is represented as citizens of their 
respective democratic national states with all the rights, entitlements and acquired statuses 
that their respective national state grants them in virtue of its legal system. That is, at the 
national level there is no exact homogeneity among legal subjects on the territory of the EU, 
since the rights, entitlements and acquired statuses they enjoy may vary from member-
state to member-state, just as the institutions safeguarding these statuses constitutionally 
and legally in the respective nations may have widely varying structures which, however, 
each in their own way are to be seen as an instrument protecting the democratically 
legitimized rights and entitlements of its own citizens. At the EU-level, in contrast, each 
member of some nation state that is member of the EU enjoys exact equality in civic status 
and legitimatory relevance with every other EU-citizen irrespective of each other’s 
nationality. Thus, when the question of the legitimacy arises, the coordinated individual EU-
citizens can judge the proposal from the perspective of associated individuals to whom the 
corresponding norm would apply and would exact effects across the board equally, by 
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deliberatively taking all relevant perspectives into account that support or undermine the 
proposal’s claim to be equally in the interest of all those affected by the coercive norm 
instituted when the proposal is accepted. As citizens of their respective nation states, the 
same persons examine then whether the implementation of the norm would result in a loss 
of democratically achieved and thus legitimate status relative to their statuses before 
implementation. In this way, legitimate nationally articulated interests constrain the 
exercise of EU-wide accepted norms while conversely legitimate EU-wide norms can 
legitimately constrain national legislative and judicial activity as long as this is not perceived 
by the citizens of that state as an unfair impairment on their statuses.  
With this construal, Habermas succeeds in subsuming the relationship between the claims 
coming from the EU-level and its institutions and those coming from the national level 
under the interaction-model of communicatively associated free and equal participants in a 
legitimation discourse that is familiar from national legitimation. Given that the claims 
coming from the EU-level are thus in principle subject to deliberative consideration and 
negotiation among the legally constituted affected perspectives, the acknowledgment of 
EU-wide regulations claiming uniform application throughout all national governments 
associated in the EU is no more than the exercise of the same competent civic deliberative 
competences as the acknowledgment of national legislation. Thus, there is no principled 
sense in which EU-citizens are not in the position of the democratic sovereign vis-à-vis 
coercive norms stemming from EU-institutions31. The status of a community capable of 
granting or revoking legitimacy to proposed decisions depends on functional places in the 
legal network constituting the two-layer structure of the EU, not on the contingent 
reference to pre-political identities.32 As Habermas expresses it, the innovative interlocking 
of legitimation flows can be construed as a “shared sovereignty”33 between EU-citizens and 
nation-states. But precisely because of this, it is simply incorrect in light of the analysis of 
                                                          
31 In consequence, those cases in which citizens and their representatives accept a regulation at the EU-level 
that they know to apply to themselves when implemented just as to every other EU-citizen uniformly 
throughout the EU are cases in which the EU-wide legitimation audience reflectively accepts a rule with the 
priority features vis-à-vis the national legal orders characteristic of decisions at the supranational level. 
32 In agreement with Habermas, the Europarechtler Thomas Schmitz remarks critically of the 
Verfassungsgerichtsentscheidung regarding the Lisboa treaty: „Das Gericht setzte sich nicht mit der 
Möglichkeit auseinander, dass die Bürger der Mitgliedsstaaten als Bürger der Union eine eigene Gemeinschaft 
bilden könnten, die auch ohne Staatsvolk zu sein, die erforderliche Legitimation spenden kann.“bpb: Das 
Grundgesetz und die Europäische Integration“, §4. 
33 Zur Verfassung Europas 
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the flows of legitimation instituted in the treaties that the supranational level lacks the 
legitimation relevant relationship to the deliberatively assessing audience addressed by its 
regulatory activities in the form of proposals for enforceable rules.34 We could say that the 
EU-citzenry appears in this model as constituted by the treaties as a supranational sovereign 
constrained by an institutionalized respect for the democratic accomplishments of its 
members that are represented equally as deliberative interlocutors of the institutions 
representing the entirety of EU-citizens in the institutions representing each member state’s 
national interests, and protected in their integrity by the provisions at various levels in the 
decision process that invalidate those supranational decisions that manifestly alter or 
damage the constitutional order of a member state without its express consent.35 In this 
sense, the interests of the collectives forming nation-states in the EU can be safeguarded in 
the same way that interests of individual citizens are safeguarded by the democratic 
procedures in national legitimation practices. 
Like Möllers, Habermas challenges the no-demos ploy at its core by parallel reasoning. If the 
deliberative model is able to normatively vindicate the legitimacy claim of democratic will 
formation procedures at the national level by reference to their nature as perspective 
coordinating communicative processes, and if the same model applies to the coordination 
of the relationship between the decision-making agencies at work in the two-level European 
supranational system, then it is utterly unclear how we should dispute the claims to 
legitimacy of supranational norms made in this system without at the same time 
discrediting the claim to legitimacy at the national level. According to Habermas, democracy 
and statehood are linked historically, not normatively. They can be detached and 
reassembled in innovative ways if complex structures of coordination and integration 
                                                          
34 *The whole in these constructions includes the whole, territorially seen, as equal part of the democratically 
legitimized legislative actors, but, precisely because it is no more than one among equals in the perspective of 
legal and regulatory competence, its degree of sovereignty is best described as “shared with” or “limited by” 
the member states and their potentially independent will. But because the decisions reached by the same 
whole that at the input side appears as a part are an output that binds each and every subject of each and 
every part of the legislative system (because it binds each and every subject of the EU, i.e. all EU citizens, and 
each and every subject of the nation-states associated by the treaties, and because this double counting is 
legitimatorily not redundant), the sharing of the legislative competence (“sovereignty”) does not result in a 
fragmentation of the legal order determined in this way (i.e. the popular will expressed by the acceptance of 
these laws is consolidated at the level of application , i.e. legal practice ).* 
35 By the described innovative interlocking networks of responsibility, representation and accessibility to 
participatory activity of the citizenry that is subject to EU-wide rules when they are implemented, the treaties 
give pragmatic substance to the commitment to constitutional democracy under the rule of law expressed in 
the ambitious preambles and the relevant Articles of the Treaties. 
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among complex systems of associated individual citizens so require without loss of 
democratic legitimacy and without the need of an additional or pre-existing constitutive act 
supplying them with a well-defined demos by converting the emerging supranational 
structure into a hierarchically ordered federal nation-state. This combination of national 
citizenship and immediate association as citizens of organizations that coordinate decision-
making among larger numbers of states is precisely what Habermas regards as the most 
promising learning effect to be gathered from the European model for the elaboration of a 
cosmopolitan global order with differentiated democratic systems of governance 
encompassing more than one nation-state. 
Of course, none of this means that the actual practices in the EU-decision making chambers 
already realize the ideal of democratic justification allowed by the treaties already at the 
supranational level. On the contrary, precisely because parts of the EU-wide decision-
making does satisfy very ambitious demands on legitimation, those parts that don’t, mostly 
found in the intergovernmental mode of decision and its institutions, become all the more 
criticizable as normative incoherencies, i.e. failures to comply with one’s own realizable 
normative standards. But none of this is able to support wholesale discreditations of the 
democratic legitimacy of the supranational level of the EU and its priority in application. 
In a third step of his “constructivist” construal, Habermas then proceeds to indicate ways in 
which the remaining task, the constitution of a legitimation-capable public sphere of 
communicating citizens, could be solved. In these reflections, he draws on earlier work on 
the place, structure and requirements that a public sphere has to satisfy in order to allow 
understanding the formation of any opinion on matters of common policy as a rational and 
cognitive process, or as an “epistemic process” that is only responsive to the forceless force 
of the better argument and excludes distortions from other, non-epistemic and non-
doxastic sources.36 To a certain extent, Habermas is here taking up the challenge posed by 
Grimm’s and Offe’s versions of the no-demos argument that suggested that under the 
conditions of so much heterogeneity in so many epistemically relevant dimensions (cultural 
background understanding, normative orientations, rational instrumental reasons, acquired 
statuses, etc.) and so much complexity, it would be sheer dreaming without factual warrant 
                                                          
36 Faktizität und Geltung, „Ist die Herausbildung einer europäischen Identität nötig, und ist sie möglich?“, 
„Three models of democracy“, etc. 
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to postulate the existence of a EU-wide public sphere apt to allow normal legitimation-
enabling communication conditions comparable to those we find in existing, naturally 
grown national publics. Habermas’ main point here is that the difficulty in establishing the 
right kind of learning processes does not exclude the local functioning of information flows 
that are sufficiently rational for the acknowledgment of the results of the relevant 
discussions as normatively as binding as on the national level. His impressive and 
unprecedentedly elaborate conception of the flow of information and of legitimation in 
complex multi-level systems illustrates what it would take for the no-demos argument to go 
through beyond a mere prejudice.37 It also allows Habermas to make much more precise 
than the no-demos proponents where one would have to stimulate which kinds of learning 
processes and new institutional structures for the growth of a European public sphere. 
These are extremely important and worthwhile reflections that demonstrate how one side’s 
modus ponens is the other side’s modus tollens: given that the European public sphere is not 
yet nearly as developed to allow a civic public sphere for the seamless and effortless 
communication of legitimation questions, the no-demos argument concludes that EU-wide 
regulations decided on the background of such a dysfunctional public sphere must 
“structurally” lack legitimacy. Habermas, on the other hand concludes that, given that 
legitimation is possible but imperfect due to the dysfunctionality, the dysfunctionality needs 
to be addressed and removed.  
The same circumstance –an extremely heterogeneous and complex social space 
encompassed by the applicability of EU law and EU-jurisdiction—thus does not wear its 
normative significance on its sleeve at all. As Habermas has a developed explanatory theory 
of why and how legitimation-relevant information is, in spite of appearances, capable of 
flowing throughout European publics and their diversity, it would be on the no-demos 
proponents to counter this with an explanation of why, in spite of the explanatory model, 
this is impossible. But we do not need to resolve this issue in our context, since we only 
need to understand how a public that is in the right kind of relation to the norms to be 
legitimized to be in a position of being entitled to participate in its legitimation is already 
now a matter of fact. That this is the decisive question is the case because only identifying 
such a position and finding it occupied with norm-responsive social agents enables saying 
                                                          
37 „Hat die Demokratie noch eine epistemische Dimension“, Gespaltener Westen... 
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that, even though the public sphere for communicative purposes may be defective, 
accepting and legitimizing supranational norms can reckon on the same relevant structures 
as on the national level, and therefore it is already now false that there is a principled 
legitimation problem (apart from the technical one of establishing complicated 
communication tasks) for rules at the supranational level that disables accepting them as as 
mandatory as those on the national level. It is here where Dewey’s conception of the social 
and natural process of the constitution and selection of relevant groups as legitimation-
competent “publics” is of indispensable help. 
 
Dewey 
Whereas Habermas’ model of the position of legitimation-subjects exploits the potentials 
accruing from the ability to communicatively resolve assessment tasks that involve 
perspective taking and placing proposals into various normative contexts to judge their 
acceptability, Dewey’s naturalist conception allows the identification of pragmatic 
structures of association that lead to the co-constitution of a public capable of legitimizing 
its own rules. It thus covers the same ground as the no-demos intuitions about pre-existing 
or underlying political identities but entirely deflates the conception of statehood 
underlying the notion of a political community as the subject of popular sovereignty. Thus, 
the existence of a legitimation-relevant demos comes too cheaply to remain unfilled for any 
moderately lasting habitual cooperation. 
As Dewey observes, something like common interests are formed as a result of the desire to 
coordinate differential responses to the situation created by the appearance of secondary 
effects from agreements of some with each other to cooperate somewhere. Whereas the 
primary cooperators are trivially interested in the results of their agreement, now previously 
unaffected people face unexpected obstacles in the performance of their lives, collective 
action plans for the solution of problems can be formed in a rational way. In this sense, the 
public of associated stakeholders is created by the factual scope of problematic situations 
created by a certain type of coordinate action decided somewhere and the changes it 
induces, and in this sense “precedes” the communicative and reflective formation of 
intelligent collective responses to the range of problematic situations caused by the 
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intervention of this type of coordinate action. Dewey’s Public is the human substrate that 
can become, if everything goes well, an articulate Öffentlichkeit but is already at its 
inarticulate inception in the functional position and in the normative competence to 
constitute those with respect to whose intelligent and informed assessments the normative 
evaluation of practical proposals for the solution of conflicts and problems needs to be 
justified. As Dewey puts it, “the greatest challenge for a public is to recognize itself.”38 
Accordingly, he spends quite some time and care to explain the reasons why under the 
complex conditions like the one triggering his account --viz., the inchoate immigration-, 
post-civil-war, post-World-War society in the middle of an unprecedented explosion of 
technological innovation and economic expansion--, why this recognition of common 
exposure to secondary effects of primary cooperations at some place in the social fabric 
gets to be a formidable task requiring, as Habermas explained, very sophisticated 
instruments of organization and articulation of a competent public opinion. But the point is 
that even before forming something like a reflective consciousness of themselves and their 
position towards the problematic situation, everyone involved of a collective identity as a 
group glued together by being exposed to the causes and effects of a certain type of 
coordinate activity, the public exists at and enjoys the normative place of being the relevant 
audience for justification of the implicit and explicit rules underlying the cooperation by the 
mere fact of being in the right position to judge and have a say. The way in which this “say” 
is to be articulated to realize a rational assessment of everything involved is, like every 
intelligent problem-solving behavior according to Dewey a reflective and multiply 
articulated feedback procedure. But important for the purposes of the possibility of 
legitimation for the rules underlying the cooperation is less the how of articulation than the 
who underlying it. 
This conception of “the public” illuminatingly explains in what sense the scope, impact and 
causal networks of objective problems that people are exposed to is one important factor in 
resolving the “most important problem of the public, to find itself”. Another important 
factor is the extent and impact of the primarily non-political cooperative relationships with 
secondary effects that do have a political dimension. This can be in the form that they 
require redistributive policies or compensation, protections of human rights, etc. for those 
                                                          
38 Public and ist Problems 
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exposed to these effects, even though they were not part of the deal that constituted the 
agreement to cooperate. Both of these elements together constitute as a matter of fact 
forces of association and social integration into the group of all those who have a legitimate 
stake in the question.  
We could call these two elements elements of involuntary political association by the effects 
of non-political cooperative agreements somewhere else. Once associated in this way, 
however, the corresponding groups acquire objectively the competence to be judge and an 
entitlement to participate in the normative assessment of regulations designed to bring the 
secondary effects under social control (e.g. in the form of a just distribution of the burdens, 
or equal protection of basic civil and human rights, etc. in the light of these secondary 
effects). Both elements are –other than in Möllers’ model-- not entirely up to the associates 
to decide but rather to be taken as a given. For Dewey, it is a next to verbal question from 
which degree of incorporation in such cooperative associations for the purpose of regulating 
the secondary effects of the non-political action in question we wish to call it a state. Much 
more important and substantial is the insight in a new principle of identifying legitimatorily 
relevant political agents: wherever there is a demand that the circumstances impose on 
groups of individuals and a regulatory capacity, then there is a public that, if additionally 
there are democratic procedures, is in the right position of legitimizing a proposal of a rule 
no matter the level of political organization. Obviously, this is a general fact about the 
relationship of concerns and interests, social communities and their employment of, but 
also reasonable and defeasible respect for their self-regulation instruments. States are more 
on the means side than on the ends side, and so are the things constituted by nation states, 
Grimm’s “Staatsvölker”. The no demos argument gets things exactly the wrong way around. 
What preexists is the normative impact of cooperation somewhere the corresponding 
public, and what comes after as a contingent historical differentiation achievement is the 
structure of the nation state. Hence, there can be no principled legitimation deficit when 
there are cooperative associations on the transnational level. It is simply another contingent 
differentiation achievement. Since, given a legally constituted state or system of 
supranational cooperation, the corresponding laws are among other things also means of 
social coordination, this trivially applies to legislation and its effects as well. Supranational 
law thus already has a public to judge its credentials as soon as it is implemented as a 
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regulation of the behavior of each and everyone on the territory of the EU or with its 
citizenship. The hunt after the demos is, in this precise sense, futile for the explanation of 
the democratic legitimacy conditions of supranational regulations. 
 
V. Analytic overview of the argument-structures 
 
The semi-formal analysis of the structures of the arguments we have discussed so far could 
be summarized as follows: the no-demos argument proceeds in these steps, with the non-
explicit or variable assumptions in square brackets. 
(1) No demos = no nation-state –[State-philosophical principle39]no democracy. 
(2) No democracy –[normative legitimation principle]no legitimation. 
(3) EU ≠ nation-state. 
Therefore:  
(4) On the strength of (3), (1), (2) [logical principle]: EUno legitimation. 
Neither (2) (the democracy principle), nor (4) (logical principles governing deductive 
inference), nor the factual premise (3) are under dispute. The definitional first part of (1) 
cannot reasonably be under dispute because it is a definition. Thus, it is only the principle 
connecting the pre-existence of a demos that is identifiable as the population of a nation 
state with the existence of democracy that is disputed. This allows the following analysis 
that focuses on this question of detail. 
The no-demos argument assumes as obvious or unproblematic that democracy requires a 
nation-state as legal infrastructure, i.e. 
(a) Democracy  nation state. 
                                                          
39 An enlightening debate about the deep reach of state-philosophical prejudice in German jurisprudence and 
legal scholarship can be found in Brunkhorst, H. „Mythos des existentiellen Staats“, in Brunkhorst, H. (2012), 
Legitimationskrisen. Verfassungsprobleme der Weltgesellschaft, Nomos, 369-85, with further references to key 
players. 
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Against this, the objection is that a weaker principle is required for the constitutive 
conditions of democracy, which is given by the sort of normative structures that guarantee 
uniformity of behavior, i.e. legal structure40: 
(a’) Democracy  legal system. 
Now it is true as a matter of standard legal theory that 
(b) Legal system -/-> nation-state. 
This is an utter triviality with regard to incorporated groups of people organized by legal 
provisions generally –such as unions, trade-regimes, sports-associations, etc.--, but it is only 
slightly less trivially obvious even when we focus on legal structures that constitute groups 
of people as subjects with rights that equip them with basic traits of civic existence. 
Examples for legal systems fulfilling this substantive function that do not constitutively 
require nation-statehood are international law, human rights law, etc.  
Given that there is no entailment-relation between legal system constituting citizen-like 
traits and nationhood, the challenge is then to motivate why –as opposed to the mentioned 
and other salient examples—specifically the EU supranational legal system should not 
count. If it does, then the question is why it excludes democratic legitimacy where neither 
international, nor human rights, nor national law does. This question asks for non-circular, 
non-question-begging reasons for the selective skepticism of the no-demos ploy. 
Going a little farther, one might try if the no-demos ploy makes a tacit non-question begging 
assumption that, if spelled out, makes the question-begging at least shared with the 
defenders of the legitimacy of EU-supranationality. So, for example, another agreed 
principle is: 
(c) democracy  constitutionalizable legal system. 
If this is accepted, as is reasonable for many reasons amply known to the community of 
political philosophers of democracy, it would explain the preference for nation-states, since 
constitutions have mainly been used to establish nation states with their constituency, the 
                                                          
40 Cf. Habermas’ “democratic principle” and its relationship as a successive specialization on the moral 
principle (U) through the discourse-principle for the clarification of the method of justification for norms 
generally, (D). 
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national demos as legal systems. Insofar as such constitutions contained democratic 
principles, they present the familiar type of constitutional democracies. However, again, a 
weaker assumption that does the same work without the national-state bias reveals that 
even inserting this tacit assumption does not make the no-demos ploy more compelling, for: 
(c’) Constitutionalizable legal system -/-> national state. 
Some scholars in the Kantian tradition would also count the institutionalized part of 
international law as constitutionalizable or even as already partly constitutionalized, but not 
all.  An excellent example for a legal system considered by standard legal scholars and 
certified by the competent courts as a constitutionalized system –such that this status is one 
de facto, not de faciendo-- is precisely the EU supranational legal system presented in the 
treaties and relevant accompanying documents (protocols, etc.). Thus it seems that there is 
no good argument that would serve to support the no-demos ploy against the possibility of 
EU-supranational legitimacy in the least.  
Let me move on to show that there is indeed, under unchanged conditions, very good 
support for the contrary view that the EU as constituted in the treaties (etc.) can be in the 
right position for legitimizing EU-wide constraints on the national legal structures of the 
member states. This is pretty straightforward. Beyond dispute, in spite of (3), are the 
following two points: 
(5) EU=supranational legal system. 
(6) EU constitution contains democratic principle. 
It is important not to confuse (6) and the much stronger and unfortunately still false 
assumption that all mechanisms of decision-making in the EU are undisputedly conforming 
to ambitious democratic standards, as we saw in the discussion of the relatively feeble 
(albeit not entirely inexistent) democratic credentials of intergovernmental decision-making. 
For the purposes of undermining the no-demos ploy, we only need to show that EU-
supranational legitimacy is possible, not that it is guaranteed (or the EU already a ‘perfect 
union’).  
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Now, if we put (5), (6) and (c) together, they entail that the EU has, with regard to the 
question of legitimation-requirements, the requisite features of a constitutionalized legal 
system with democratic principle. Applying the undisputed democratic principle of 
legitimacy (2), this means that it cannot be excluded that correctly formed and decided 
parts of the EU supranational legal system are legitimate. This non-excludability of 
legitimacy obviously encompasses the specific class of regulations that the no-demos 
argument is geared against, viz. those with effects on the national legal systems. The most 
one can avert is that these effects need to be monitored as to their intra-national 
legitimation when they affect democratically justified legal norms that are constitutive for 
the internal democratic structure of the affected nation-states. Such a monitoring 
requirement would be an innovation required by supranational legal structures vis-à-vis 
both national states and international agreements among nation states. 
 
VI. Forget no demos 
I conclude that none of the versions of the no-demos argument are compelling even on the 
most charitable readings. Therefore, the corresponding conclusions depending on it 
regarding the lack of democratic legitimacy either of the project of a continued political 
integration of the EU (Streeck) or of the priority of EU law over national law in those areas 
specifically delegated to the EU in the treaties have to be seen as depending on the 
problematic and not further supported assumption of a nation-state based perspective from 
the very start, i.e. a certain traditionalism in the analysis of the innovative features of multi-
level governance such as the one realized in the EU institutions.  
That this is a problematic assumption (i.e. one in need of independent support to be 
admissible in an argument) can be seen by the fact that there are a number of alternative 
ways of investigating the legitimacy of an additional and partly autonomous layer of 
supranational regulation that also binds the national legislative, seen from their standpoint, 
“from without”, but without forming an “external regime”. At least the three of these ways 
that I have presented41 reach the opposite conclusion, viz. that the integration process 
                                                          
41 (and there are others, such as a capacity based approach on legitimacy, that I have not even mentioned or 
thought about enough but predict would come to similar results) 
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reached through the process of maturation of the political nature of the supranational 
legislative level in the EU can be seen as having already now equipped the latter enough for 
it to count as as legitimate as the national legislative level, and as having the place of the 
legitimating public adequately occupied. Having reason to follow the recommendations of 
no-demos based accounts would therefore require further arguments that are independent 
of the nation-state bias built into them.  
On the other hand, politically all three rebuttals of the no-demos ploy contain important 
indications of how exactly to confront the institutional democracy deficits in the Union 
decision procedures that every writer on these topics also acknowledges. Although Lisbon 
already has made much progress in some respects, it also made regress, e.g. in 
acknowledging the intergovernmental decision modality and its agent, the EU-Council. 
Similarly, permanent concerns about the transparency and accessibility to civic participation 
of the complicated decision processes at the EU will have to be addressed with innovative 
ideas if the formation and education of an informed and competent EU-citizenry is to be 
accomplished. As should be clear, these proposals only can be understood as normative 
demands accruing from the perspective of legitimation-requirements when the obvious is 
theoretically in the clear: that there is, in Europe, already right now a supranational public, 
and it is in the right position to legitimize or challenge regulations at this level or, for short: 
that EU-supranational legitimacy is possible, available, already exemplified, but, precisely 
because this is so, noticeably not yet everywhere realized. Like all known constitutional 
democracies, legitimizing EU-supranational regulations and their consequences 
democratically is thus an ongoing task, not a ready-made given. 
